“I have never killed any one, but I have read some obituary notices with great satisfaction.” – Clarence Darrow
Well, I have had trouble reading some obituaries that I would have read with great satisfaction. Hold on to this thought.
Professor Anatol Lieven, much respected today, left, right and centre for bringing a “neutral” perspective on Pakistan in his book, “Pakistan: A Hard Country” and loved by many a Pakistani for portraying an image that the country is not failing. Sadly, only one major review (“Love Letter to Rawalpindi“) noted the major theme of the book, the book tainted with an extensive love of the Army. Manan Ahmed took the book to the grinder recently too,
“…. Lieven provides a vigorous defence of the armed forces. In a book in which almost every segment of Pakistani society gets a ribbing (the lawyers are dubbed “penguins in hell”, Pakistani middle-class homes resemble “third-class cabins in the bowels of a cruise ship” because of tube lights), there is only one body that Lieven finds worthy of praise: the military. It is a “striking institution”, he says, with discipline, efficiency and solidarity, and which provides “opportunities that the Pakistani economy cannot” by having their subsidised factories “ploughed back into its industry and not simply stolen”.
Lieven acknowledges the pernicious effects of the Inter-Services Intelligence and that the actions in Balochistan are self-destructive, yet there remains the wonder – at the cleanliness of military hospitals (which he thinks remain unmatched by their civilian counterparts), the smartness of the soldiers, the high-regard for their service. The Pakistani army is, to Lieven, “the only element of a great society that has ever existed in Pakistan”.
This romance would not be so unseemly if in his many interviews – and decades-long visits – Lieven had perceived the hundreds of thousands of grunt recruits who become orderlies, drivers, cooks, gardeners and nannies to the commissioned officers. With meagre salaries and near-bondage relationships to their “assigned officers”, this vast underclass of the Pakistani army keeps the cantonments clean, the major happy and the cars washed. Their silence makes just as much a lie out of Pakistan’s “great society” as the exploitative, self-immolating behaviour of the rest of the Pakistan military.
For further effect, here is a story-obituary filed by Lieven, as a reporter of The Times in Pakistan, on the death of General Muhammad Zia ul Haq (first brought to my attention by Takhalus). It is vomit inducing to say the least. Emphasis is mine.
Subtle general outmanoeuvred his foes; Death of President Zia; Pakistan
by Anatol Lieven
The Times (London) – Thursday, August 18, 1988.
General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq ruled Pakistan for 11 years almost a quarter of its existence. Yet up to his death he remained an enigma.
The most machiavellian subtlety in his political behaviour contrasted with what seemed the basic simplicity of his character.
Despised as a stupid soldier on coming to power, he regularly outmanoeuvred all those who ‘thought themselves smarter’ which included many erstwhile friends and the man who appointed him, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
The probability is that, without the explosion that claimed his life yesterday, he would have repeated the process in the parliamentary and municipal elections he had called for November.
He won respect even from some of his political enemies for his lack of vindictiveness. It was said that his repression, unlike that of his predecessors, stopped with individuals and was not extended to attempts to destroy their families.
From that point of view he has some claim despite his capacity for going back on his public promises, which led to his title of Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) becoming Cancel My Last Announcement to be remembered as an honourable man.
General Zia came from middle-class origins, not from one of the great feudal families. He was always a pious Muslim and his personal life seems to have been free of scandal, unlike that of his predecessor as ruler, Bhutto, and much of Pakistan’s elite.
As ruler of Pakistan he pushed forward a policy of Islamization of the legal system and public life. That and the growing independence of his Prime Minister, Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo, who allegedly had not been moving quickly enough in that regard, played a large part in Mr Junejo’s dismissal in May.
General Zia was a fighting soldier. After being commissioned into the British Indian cavalry in 1946, and choosing to emigrate to Pakistan the next year, he served in all three wars against India. For the greater part of his career, in contrast to so many of his fellow-officers, he showed no interest in politics, despite the fact that the Army was in power for much of the period.
General Zia’s apparent bluff simplicity doubtless influenced Bhutto to appoint him Chief of the General Staff in 1976, over the heads of more senior officers. There is a story, however, that subsequently the hot-tempered Bhutto insulted his Chief of Staff, thereby dissolving the general’s loyalty to him.
The Islamization policy became to some extent a substitute for his earlier promise of a quick return to democracy. Like so much in his career, it was an inextricable mixture of conviction and an opportunistic desire to provide some ideological and moral foundation for his rule and for the Muslim League Party on which he sought to base his government. He had little success in this, or in his avowed aim of restoring Pakistan to democracy.
He was probably hardly sincere in either aim, though he may not have been conscious of the contradictions between some of his ideas.
Without President Zia, Pakistan is in much the same condition it was when he came to power: a little richer, a little more violent, corrupt and drug-addicted. It remains without solid political structures and the unifying ideology Islam was supposed to provide.
So it is likely that General Zia’s successors will be more generals. They will be lucky if they possess his political intelligence and stamina.
Lieven’s greatest points, highlighted above, require comments.
- Perhaps Zia was not really “vindictive”. Just that he hanged the Prime Minister he feared would take him to task for overthrowing him. And perhaps he did not “destroy their families”. Only that Benazir landed in the ICU after being confined to solitary confinement.
- Junejo’s inquiry into Ojhri and his increasing independence to pursue policy were not the major reasons of course. Clean hearted sincere Zia was merely looking after Islamization.
- Nothing needs to be said.
- Maybe Lieven would have liked Aslam Beg to take over. One more military ruler to love. Damn those third world countries need “good dictators” to keep them in line and prosper.
The obituary in The Times was a bit less puke inducing, but equally troubling, as it overlooked the censored parts of history.
His political longevity was often attributed to luck, but though he had his full share of good fortune, he owed much to his political astuteness, intuition and determination.
Zia was not a typical military ruler. He was very tolerant of personal criticism and disarmed both friend and foe alike by his willingness to listen and his lack of personal pride. However, where his own survival was at stake he was adamant and inflexible, and he displayed the same qualities in exercising his prerogative of mercy.
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This guy Lie-ven sounds like Zia’s mother to me!
Thanks for the plug I agree very much with the opening comments
I knew the family off one of the people on that fateful flight
His wife & kids were simple people and had little money to their name
It is important that we not forget off those who died
not all drank from the same well as him
i might be wrong here since i know squat about Lieven, but surely that obit, particularly in the Times was also a reflection of the need to prop up counter-narratives against communism in a bi-polar world. Loaded as it seems, we have to remember that ‘Islamisation’ was not a dirty word for the world back then. consequently, it provided observers something to work with, because otherwise all they could see in the post-colonial world was apparent chaos and messy politics. their particular distaste being reserved perhaps for leaders with opposing/troubling ideologies.
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